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Main variables:
w = wholesale price per unit (chosen by the manufacturer)
q = order quantity (rate chosen by the retailer)
R = retail price per unit (chosen by the retailer)
D = demand (random rate)
M = production cost per unit (fixed)
S = salvage price per unit (fixed)
1. Introduction
The one-period newsvendor model is a widely studied object that has attracted increasing interest in
the last two decades. The basic setting is that a retailer wants to order a quantity q from a manufacturer.
Demand D is a random variable, and the retailer wishes to select an order quantity q maximizing his
expected profit. When the distribution of D is known, this problem is easily solved. The basic problem is
very simple, but appears to have a never-ending number of variations. There is now a very large literature
on such problems, and for further reading we refer to the survey papers by Cacho´n (2003) and Qin et al.
(2011) and the numerous references therein.
The (discrete) multiperiod newsvendor problem has been studied in detail by many authors, including
Matsuyama (2004), Berling (2006), Bensoussan et al. (2007, 2009), Wang et al., (2010), just to quote
some of the more recent contributions. Two papers whose approach is not unlike that used in our paper
are Kogan (2003) and Kogan and Lou (2003), where the authors consider continuous time-scheduling
problems.
In many cases, demand is not known and the parties gain information through a sequence of obser-
vations. There is a huge literature on cases with partial information, e.g., Scarf (1958), Gallego & Moon
(1993), Bensoussan et al. (2007), Perakis & Roels (2008), Wang et al. (2010), just to mention a few.
When a sufficiently large number of observations have been made, the distribution of demand is fully
revealed and can be used to optimize order quantities. This approach only works if the distribution of D
is static, and leads to false conclusions if demand changes systematically over time. In this paper we will
assume that the demand rate is a stochastic process Dt and we seek optimal decision rules for that case.
In our paper, a retailer and a manufacturer write contracts for a specific delivery rate following a de-
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cision process in which the manufacturer is the leader who initially decides the wholesale price. Based on
that wholesale price, the retailer decides on the delivery rate and the retail price. We assume a Stackelberg
framework, and hence ignore cases where the retailer can negotiate the wholesale price. The contract is
written at time t−δ, and goods are received at time t. It is essential to assume that information is delayed.
If there is no delay, the demand rate is known, and the retailer’s order rate is made equal to the demand
rate. Information is delayed by a time δ. One justification for this is that production takes time, and
orders cannot be placed and effectuated instantly. It is natural to think about δ as a production lead time.
The single period newsvendor problem with price dependent demand is classical, see Whitin (1955).
Mills (1959) refined the construction considering the case where demand uncertainty is added to the
price-demand curve, while Karlin and Carr (1962) considered the case where demand uncertainty is
multiplied with the price-demand curve. For a nice review of the problem with extensions see Petruzzi
and Dada (1999). Stackelberg games for single period newsvendor problems with fixed retail price have
been studied extensively by Lariviere and Porteus (2001), providing quite general conditions under which
unique equilibria can be found.
Multiperiod newsvendor problems with delayed information have been discussed in several papers, but
none of these papers appears to make the theory operational. Bensoussan et al. (2009) use a time-discrete
approach and generalize several information delay models. However, these are all under the assumption
of independence of the delay process from inventory, demand, and the ordering process. They assert that
removing this assumption would give rise to interesting as well as challenging research problems, and
that a study of computation of the optimal base stock levels and their behavior with respect to problem
parameters would be of interest. Computational issues are not explored in their paper, and they only
consider decision problems for inventory managers, disregarding any game theoretical issues.
Calzolari et al. (2011) discuss filtering of stochastic systems with fixed delay, indicating that problems
with delay lead to nontrivial numerical difficulties even when the driving process is Brownian motion. In
our paper, solutions to general delayed newsvendor equilibria are formulated in terms of coupled systems
of stochastic differential equations. Our approach may hence be useful also in the general case where
closed form solutions cannot be obtained.
Stochastic differential games have been studied extensively in the literature. However, most of the
works in this area have been based on dynamic programming and the associated Hamilon-Jacobi-Bellman-
Isaacs type of equations for systems driven by Brownian motion only. More recently, papers on stochastic
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differential games based on the maximum principle (including jump diffusions) have appeared. See, e.g.,
Øksendal and Sulem (2012) and the references therein. This is the approach used in our paper, and as
far as we know, the application to the newsvendor model is new. The advantage with the maximum
approach is two-fold:
• We can handle non-Markovian state equations and non-Markovian payoffs.
• We can deal with games with partial and asymmetric information.
Figure 1 shows a sample path of an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process that is mean reverting around a level
µ = 100. Even though the long-time average is 100, orders based on this average are clearly suboptimal.
At, e.g., t = 30, we observe a demand rate D30 = 157. When the mean reversion rate is as slow as
in Figure 1, the information D30 = 157 increases the odds that the demand rate is more than 100 at
time t = 37. If the delay δ = 7 (days), the retailer should hence try to exploit this extra information to
improve performance.
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Figure 1: An Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with delayed information
Based on the information available at time t − δ, the manufacturer should offer the retailer a price
per unit wt for items delivered at time t. Given the wholesale price wt and all available information, the
retailer should decide on an order rate qt and a retail price Rt. The retail price can in principle lead to
changes in demand, and in general the demand rate Dt is, hence, a function of Rt. However, such cases
are hard to solve in terms of explicit expressions. We will also look at the simplified case where R is
exogenously given and fixed. To carry out our construction, we will need to assume that items cannot
be stored. That is of course a strong limitation, but applies to important cases like electricity markets
and markets for fresh foods.
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Assuming that both parties have full information about demand rate at time t− δ, and that the man-
ufacturer knows how much the retailer will order at any given unit price w, we are left with a Stackelberg
game where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. To our knowledge, stochastic
differential games of this sort have not been discussed in the literature previously. Before we can discuss
game equilibria for the newsvendor problem, we must formulate and prove a maximum principle for
general stochastic differential Stackelberg games.
In the case where R is exogenously given and fixed, it seems reasonable to conjecture that our op-
timization problem could be reduced to solving a family of static newsvendor problems pointwise in t.
Theorem 3.2.2 confirms that this approach provides the correct solution to the problem. Note, however,
that our general framework is non-Markovian, and that solutions may depend on path properties of the
demand.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a framework where we discuss general
stochastic differential Stackelberg games. In Section 3, we use the machinery in Section 2 to consider a
continuous-time newsvendor problem. In Section 4, we consider the special case where the demand rate
is given by an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process and provide explicit solutions for the unique equilibria that
occur in that case. Examples with R-dependent demand are considered in Section 5. Finally, in Section
6 we offer some concluding remarks.
2. General stochastic differential Stackelberg games
In this section, we will consider general stochastic differential Stackelberg games. In our framework,
the state of the system is given by a stochastic process Xt. The game has two players. Player 1 (leader,
denoted by L) can at time t choose a control uL(t) while player 2 (follower, denoted by F ) can choose a
control uF (t). The controls determine how Xt evolves in time. The performance for player i is assumed
to be of the form
Ji(uL, uF ) = E
[∫ T
δ
fi(t,Xt, uL(t), uF (t), ω)dt+ gi(XT , ω)
]
i = L,F (1)
where fi(t, x, w, v, ω) : [0, T ]×R×Rl×Rm×Ω→ R is a given Ft-adapted process and gi(x, ω) : R×Ω→ R
are given FT -measurable random variables for each x,w, v; i = L,F . We will assume that fi are C1 in
v, w, x and that gi are C1 in x, i = L,F .
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In our Stackelberg game, player 1 is the leader, and player 2 the follower. Hence when uL is revealed
to the follower, the follower will choose uF to maximize JF (uL, uF ). The leader knows that the follower
will act in this rational way.
Suppose that for any given control uL there exists a map Φ (a “maximizer” map) that selects uF that
maximizes JF (uL, uF ). The leader will hence choose uL = u∗L such that uL 7→ JL(uL,Φ(uL)) is maximal
for uL = u∗L. In order to solve problems of this type we need to specify how the state of the system
evolves in time. We will assume that the state of the system is given by a controlled jump diffusion of
the form:
dXt = µ(t,Xt, u(t), ω)dt+ σ(t,Xt, u(t), ω)dBt
+
∫
R
γ(t,Xt− , u(t), ξ, ω)N˜(dt, dξ) (2)
X(0) = x ∈ R
where the coefficients µ(t, x, u, ω) : [0, T ]× R× U× Ω → R, σ(t, x, u, ω) : [0, T ]× R× U× Ω → R× Rn,
γ(t, x, u, ξ, ω) : [0, T ]× R× U× R0 × Ω→ R are given continuous functions assumed to be continuously
differentiable with respect to x and u, and R0 = R \ {0}. Here Bt = B(t, ω); (t, ω) ∈ [0,∞) × Ω is a
Brownian motion in Rn and N˜(dt, dξ) = N˜(dt, dξ, ω) is an independent compensated Poisson random
measure on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ). See Øksendal and Sulem (2007) for more
information about controlled jump diffusions. The set U = UL × UF is a given set of admissible control
values u(t, ω). We assume that the control u = u(t, ω) consists of two components, u = (uL, uF ), where
the leader controls uL∈ Rl and the follower controls uF∈ Rm. We also assume that the information flow
available to the players is given by the filtration {Et}t∈[0,T ], where
Et ⊆ Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (3)
For example, the case much studied in this paper is when
Et = Ft−δ for all t ∈ [δ, T ]. (4)
for some fixed information delay δ > 0. We assume that uL(t) and uF (t) are Et-predictable, and assume
there is given a family AE= AL,E ×AF,E of admissible controls contained in the set of Et-predictable
processes.
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We now consider the following game theoretic situation:
Suppose the leader decides her control process uL ∈ AL,E . At any time t the value is immediately
known to the follower. Therefore he chooses uF = u∗F ∈ AF,E such that
uF 7→ JF (uL, uF ) is maximal for uF = u∗F . (5)
Assume that there exists a measurable map Φ : AL,E → AF,E such that
uF 7→ JF (uL, uF ) is maximal for uF = u∗F = Φ(uL) (6)
The leader knows that the follower will act in this rational way. Therefore the leader will choose uL =
u∗L ∈ AL,E such that
uL 7→ JL(uL,Φ(uL)) is maximal for uL = u∗L. (7)
The control u∗ := (u∗L,Φ(u
∗
L)) ∈ AL,E ×AF,E is called a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game defined by
(1)-(2). In the newsvendor problem studied in this paper, the leader is the manufacturer who decides the
wholesale price uL = w for the retailer, who is the follower, and who decides the order rate u
(1)
F = q and
the retailer price u(2)F = R. Thus uF = (q,R). We may summarize (5) and (7) as follows:
max
uF∈AF,E
JF (uL, uF ) = JF (uL,Φ(uL)) (8)
and
max
uL∈AL,E
JL(uL,Φ(uL)) = JL(u∗L,Φ(u
∗
L)) (9)
We see that (8) and (9) constitute two consecutive stochastic control problems with partial informa-
tion, and hence we can, under some conditions, use the maximum principle for such problems as pre-
sented in Øksendal and Sulem (2012) (see also, e.g., Framstad et al. (2004) and Baghery and Øksendal
(2007)) to find a maximum principle for Stackelberg equilibria. To this end, we define the Hamiltonian
HF (t, x, u, aF , bF , cF (·), ω) : [0, T ]× R× U× R× Rn+1 ×R×Ω→ R by
HF (t, x, u, aF , bF , cF (·), ω) = fF (t, x, u, ω) + µ(t, x, u, ω)aF + σ(t, x, u, ω)bF (10)
+
∫
R
γ(t, x, u, ξ, ω)cF (ξ)ν(dξ);
where R is the set of functions c(·) : R0 → R such that (10) converges, ν is a Le´vy measure. For simplicity
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of notation the explicit dependence on ω ∈ Ω is suppressed in the following. The adjoint equation for HF
in the unknown adjoint processes aF (t), bF (t), and cF (t, ξ) is the following backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE):
daF (t) = −∂HF
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t), aF (t), bF (t), cF (t, ·))dt (11)
+ bF (t)dBt +
∫
R
cF (t, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
aF (T ) = gF ′(X(T )) (12)
Here X(t) = Xu(t) is the solution to (2) corresponding to the control u ∈ AE . Next, assume that there
exists a function φ : [0, T ]× UL × Ω→ UF such that
Φ(uL)(t) = φ(t, ul(t)) i.e Φ(uL) = φ(·, uL(·)) (13)
Define the Hamiltonian HφL(t, x, uL, aL, bL, cL(·)) : [0, T ]× R× UL × R× Rn+1 ×R → R by
HφL(t, x, uL, aL, bL, cL(·)) = fL(t, x, uL,Φ(uL)) + µ(t, x, uL,Φ(uL))aL (14)
+ σ(t, x, uL,Φ(uL))bL +
∫
R
γ(t, x, uL,Φ(uL), ξ)cL(ξ)ν(dξ)
The adjoint equation (for HφL) in the unknown processes aL(t), bL(t), cL(t, ξ) is the following BSDE:
daL(t) = −∂H
φ
L
∂x
(t,X(t), uL(t), φ(t, uL(t)), aL(t), bL(t), cL(t, ·))dt (15)
+ bL(t)dBt +
∫
R
cL(t, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
aL(T ) = gL′(X(T )) (16)
Here X(t) = XuL,Φ(uL)(t) is the solution to (2) corresponding to the control u(t) := (uL(t), φ(t, uL(t)));
t ∈ [0, T ], assuming that this is admissible.
We make the following assumptions:
(A1) For all ui ∈ Ai,E and all bounded βi ∈ Ai,E there exists  > 0 such that
ui + sβi ∈ Ai,E for all s ∈ (−, ); i = L,F .
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(A2) For all t0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded Et0-measurable random variables αi, the control process
βi(t) defined by
βi(t) =

αi if t ∈ [t0, T ]
0 otherwise
; t ∈ [0, T ]
belongs to Ai,E ; i = L,F .
(A3) For all ui, βi ∈ Ai,E with βi bounded, the derivative processes
ξL(t) =
d
ds
(
XuL+sβL,uF (t)
) ∣∣∣
s=0
ξF (t) =
d
ds
(
XuL,uF+sβF (t)
) ∣∣∣
s=0
exist and belong to L2(λ× P ), where λ denotes Lebesgue measure on [0, T ].
We can now formulate our maximum principle for Stackelberg equilibria:
Theorem 2.1 (Maximum principle)
Assume that (13) and (A1)–(A3) hold. Put u = (uL, uF ) = (uL,Φ(uL)) where Φ : UL → UF , and let
X(t), (ai, bi, ci) be the corresponding solutions of (2), (11)–(12) (for i = F ) and (15)–(16) (for i = L),
respectively.
Suppose that for all bounded βi ∈ Ai,E , i = L,F we have
E
[ ∫ T
0
{
(ai(t))2
((∂σ
∂x
(t)ξi(i) +
∂σ
∂ui
(t)βi(t)
)2
+
∫
R
(∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)ξi(t) +
∂γ
∂ui
(t, ζ)βi(t)
)2
ν(dζ)
)
(17)
+ ξ2i (t)
(
(bi(t))2 +
∫
R
(ci(t, ζ))2ν(dζ)
)}
dt
]
<∞
Then the following, (I) and (II), are equivalent.
(I)
d
ds
(JF (uL,Φ(uL) + sβF ))
∣∣
s=0
=
d
ds
(JL(uL + sβL,Φ(uL + sβL)))
∣∣
s=0
= 0 (18)
for all bounded βL ∈ AL,E , βF ∈ AF,E .
(II)
E
[
∂
∂vF
HF (t,X(t), uL(t), vF , aF (t), bF (t), cF (t, ·))
∣∣∣∣Et]
vF=Φ(uL)
= 0 (19)
for j = 1, 2 and
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E
[
∂
∂vL
HφL(t,X(t), vL, aL(t), bL(t), cL(t, ·))
∣∣∣∣Et]
vL=uL(t)
= 0 (20)
Proof
This follows by first applying the maximum principle for optimal control with respect to uF ∈ AF,E of
the state process XuL,uF (t) for fixed uL ∈ AL,E , as presented in Øksendal and Sulem (2012). See also
Framstad et al. (2004), Baghery and Øksendal (2007), Øksendal and Sulem (2007). Next we apply the
same maximum principle with respect to uL ∈ AL,E of the state process XuL,Φ(uL)(t), for the given
function Φ. We omit the details.

Corollary 2.2
Suppose (uL,Φ(uL)) is a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game (1)-(2) and that (13), (A1)-(A3), and (17)
are satisfied. Then the first order conditions (19)–(20) hold.
3. A continuous time newsvendor problem
In this section, we will formulate a continuous time newsvendor problem and use the results in Sec-
tion 2 to describe a set of explicit equations that we need to solve to find Stackelberg equilibria. We
will assume that the demand rate for a good is given by a (possibly controlled) stochastic process Dt. A
retailer is at time t− δ offered a unit price wt for items to be delivered at time t. Here δ > 0 is the delay
time. At time t− δ, the retailer chooses an order rate qt. The retailer also decides a retail price Rt. We
assume that items can be salvaged at a unit price S ≥ 0, and that items cannot be stored, i.e., they must
be sold instantly or salvaged.
Remarks
The delay δ can be interpreted as a production lead time, and it is natural to assume that wt and qt
should both be settled at time t − δ. In general the retail price Rt can be settled at a later stage. To
simplify notation we assume that Rt, too, is settled at time t− δ. The assumption that items cannot be
stored is, of course, quite restrictive. Many important cases lead to assumptions of this kind; we mention
in particular the electricity market and markets for fresh foods.
Assuming that sale will take part in the time period δ ≤ t ≤ T , the retailer will get an expected profit
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JF (w, q,R) = E
[∫ T
δ
(Rt − S) min[Dt, qt]− (wt − S)qtdt
]
(21)
When the manufacturer has a fixed production cost per unit M , the manufacturer will get an expected
profit
JL(w, q,R) = E
[∫ T
δ
(wt −M)qtdt
]
(22)
Technical remarks
To solve these problems mathematically, it is convenient to apply an equivalent mathematical formulation:
At time t the retailer orders the quantity t for immediate delivery, but the information at that time is the
delayed information Ft−δ about the demand δ units of time. Similarly, when the manufacturer delivers
the ordered quantity qt at time t, the unit price wt is based on Ft−δ. From a practical point of view this
formulation is entirely different, but leads to the same optimization problem.
3.1. Formalized information
We will assume that our demand rate is given by a (possibly controlled) process of the form
dDt = µ(t,Dt, Rt, ω)dt+ σ(t,Dt, Rt, ω)dBt +
∫
R
γ(t,Dt− , Rt, ξ, ω)N˜(dt, dξ); t ∈ [0, T ] (23)
D0 = d0 ∈ R
Brownian motion Bt and the compensated Poisson term N˜(t, dz) are driving the stochastic differential
equation in (23), and it is hence natural to formalize information with respect to these objects. We
therefore let Ft denote the σ-algebra generated by Bs and N˜(s, dz), 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Intuitively Ft contains
all the information up to time t. When information is delayed, we instead consider the σ-algebras
Et := Ft−δ t ∈ [δ, T ] (24)
Both the retailer and the manufacturer should base their actions on the delayed information. Technically
that means that qt and wt should be Et-adapted, i.e., q and w should be E-predictable processes. In
principle, the retail price Rt can be settled at a later stage. This case is possible to handle, but leads to
complicated notation. We hence only consider the case where Rt is E-predictable.
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3.2. Finding Stackelberg equilibria in the newsvendor model
We now apply our general result for stochastic Stackelberg games to the newsvendor problem. In
the newsvendor problem, we have the control u = (uL, uF ) where uL = w is the wholesale price, and
uF = (q,R) with q the order rate and R the retail price. Moreover Xt = Dt,
fL(t,X(t), u(t)) = (wt −M)qt, gL = 0, (25)
fF (t,X(t), u(t)) = (Rt − S) min(Dt, qt)− (wt − S)qt, and gF = 0. (26)
Therefore by (10)
HF (t,Dt, qt, Rt, wt, aF (t), bF (t), cF (t, ·)) = (Rt − S) min(Dt, qt)− (wt − S)qt (27)
+ aF (t)µ(t,Dt, Rt) + bF (t)σ(t,Dt, Rt)
+
∫
R
γ(t,Dt, Rt, ξ)cF (ξ)ν(dξ)
Similarly by (14) , with uF = φ(uL) = (φ1(w), φ2(w)) = (q(w), R(w)),
HφL(t,Dt, wt, aL(t), bL(t), cL(t, ·)) (28)
=(wt −M)φ1(t, w(t)) + aL(t)µ(t,Dt, φ2(t, w(t))) + bL(t)σ(t,Dt, φ2(t, w(t)))) (29)
+
∫
R
cL(t, ξ)γ(t,Dt, φ2(t, w(t)), ξ)ν(dξ) (30)
Here we have assumed that the dynamics of Dt only depends on the control Rt = φ2(t, w(t)) and has the
general form
dDt = µ(t,Dt, Rt)dt+ σ(t,Dt, Rt)dBt (31)
+
∫
R
γ(t,Dt− , Rt, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); t ∈ [0, T ]
D0 = d0 ∈ R (32)
where µ(t,D,R), σ(t,D,R) and γ(t,D, T, ξ) are continuous with respect to t and continuously differen-
tiable (C1) with respect to D and R. We chooseAL,E ,AF,E to be the set of all E-predictable processes with
values in UL = R and UF = R2 respectively, where Et = Ft−δ as above. Then we see that assumptions
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(A1)-(A3) hold, with ξL(t) and ξF (t) given by ξL(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
dξF (t) = ξF (t)
(
∂µ
∂D
(t,Dt, Rt)dt+
∂σ
∂D
(t,Dt, Rt)dBt +
∫
R
∂γ
∂D
(t,Dt− , Rt, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ)
)
(33)
+ βF (t) ·
(
∂µ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rt)dt+
∂σ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rt)dBt +
∫
R
∂γ
∂R
(t,Dt− , Rt, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ)
)
; t ∈ [0, T ]
ξF (0) = 0 (34)
where · denotes a vector product. To find a Stackelberg equilibrium we use Theorem 2.1. Hence by (19)
we get the following first order conditions for the optimal values qˆt = φ1(t, wˆ(t)), Rˆt = φ2(t, wˆ(t)):
E
[
(Rˆt − S)X[0,Dt](qˆt)− wt + S
∣∣Et] = 0 (35)
and
E
[
min(Dt, qˆt) + aF (t)
∂µ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rˆ) (36)
+bF (t)
∂σ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rˆ) +
∫
R
cF (t, ξ)
∂γ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rˆ, ξ)ν(dξ)
∣∣∣Et] = 0
Here X[0,Dt](qˆt) denotes the indicator function for the interval [0, Dt], i.e., a function that has the value
1 if 0 ≤ qˆt ≤ Dt, and is zero otherwise. Let qˆt = Φ1(w)(t), Rˆt = Φ2(w)(t) be the solution of this coupled
system. Next, by (20) we get the first-order condition
(wˆt −M)φ′1(t, wˆ(t)) + φ1(t, wˆ(t)) + φ′2(t, wˆ(t))E
[
aL(t)
∂µ
∂R
(t,Dtφ2(t, wˆ(t))) (37)
+bL(t)
∂σ
∂R
(t,Dt, φ2(t, wˆ(t))) +
∫
R
cL(t, ξ)
∂γ
∂R
(t,Dt, φ2(t, wˆ(t)), ξ)ν(dξ)
∣∣∣Et] = 0
for the optimal value wˆt. We summarize what we have proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1
Suppose u∗ is a Stackelberg equilibrium for the newsvendor problem with state Xt = Dt given by (31) and
performance functionals
JL(w, (q,R)) = E
[∫ T
δ
(wt −M)qtdt
]
(manufacturer’s profit) (38)
JF (w, (q,R)) = E
[∫ T
δ
(
(Rt − S) min(Dt, qt)− (wt − S)qt
)
dt
]
(retailer’s profit) (39)
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Assume that (13), (A1)-(A3), and (17) hold. Let qˆt = φ1(t, w(t)), Rˆt = φ2(t, w(t)) be the solution of
(35)–(36). Assume that φi ∈ C1 and that the conditions of Theorem 2.1 are satisfied. Let wˆt be the
solution of (37). Then
u∗ = (wˆt, (φ1(t, wˆ(t)), φ2(t, wˆ(t))) ∈ AE
In other words
max
(q,R)∈AF,E
{JF (w, (q,R))} = JF (w, (Φ1(w),Φ2(w))) (40)
and
max
w∈AL,E
{JL(w, (Φ1(w),Φ2(w)))} = JL(wˆ, (Φ1(wˆ),Φ2(wˆ))) (41)
Remark
Note that if R is fixed and cannot be chosen by the retailer, then (36) is irrelevant and we are left with
(35) leading to the simpler equations in Theorem 3.2.2. In the special case when Dt does not depend on
Rt, we get:
Theorem 3.2.2
Assume that Dt has a continuous distribution, that Dt does not depend on Rt and that Rt = R is
exogenously given and fixed. For any given wt with S < M ≤ wt ≤ R consider the equation
E
[
(R− S)X[0,Dt](qt)− wt + S|Et
]
= 0 (42)
Let qt = φ1(t, w(t)) denote the unique solution of (42), and assume that the function
wt 7→ E [(wt −M)φ1(t, w(t))] (43)
has a unique maximum at wt = wˆt. Then with qˆt = φ1(t, wˆ(t)) the pair (wˆ, qˆ) is a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium for the newsvendor problem defined by (22) and (21).
Proof
To see why (42) always has a unique solution, note that wt is Et-measurable and hence (42) is equivalent
to
E
[X[0,Dt](qt)|Et] = wt − SR− S (44)
Existence and uniqueness of qt then follows from monotonicity of conditional expectation. Uniqueness of
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the Stackelberg equilibrium follows from Theorem 3.2.1. To see that the candidate qˆt = Φ1(wˆ)(t) is indeed
a Stackelberg Equilibrium, we argue as follows: Since the maximum wˆt is unique, any other wt will lead
to strictly lower expected profit at time t. As demand does not depend on wt, low expected profit at one
point in time cannot be compensated by higher expected profits later on. Hence if the statement wt = wˆt
a.s. λ × P (λ denotes Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]) is false, any such strategy will lead to strictly lower
expected profits. The same argument applies for the retailer, and hence (wˆ, qˆ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium.

To avoid degenerate cases we need to know that Dt has a continuous distribution. In the next sec-
tions we will consider special cases, and we will often be able to write down explicit solutions to (42) and
prove that (43) has a unique maximum. Notice that (42) is an equation defined in terms of conditional
expectation. Conditional statements of this type are in general difficult to compute, and the challenge is
to state the result in terms of unconditional expectations.
4. Explicit solution formulas
In this section we will assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.1 hold.
4.1. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with constant coefficients
In this section, we offer explicit formulas for the equilibria that occur when the demand rate is given
by a constant coefficient Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, i.e., the case where Dt is given by
dDt = a(µ−Dt)dt+ σdBt (45)
where a, µ, and σ are constants. The Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process is important in many applications.
In particular, it is commonly used as a model for the electricity market. The process is mean reverting
around the constant level µ, and the constant a decides the speed of mean reversion. The explicit solution
to (45) is
Dt = D0e−at + µ(1− e−at) +
∫ t
0
σea(s−t)dBs (46)
It is easy to see that
Dt = Dt−δe−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ) +
∫ t
t−δ
σea(s−t)dBs (47)
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Because the last term is independent of Et with a normal distribution N(0, σ
2(1−e−2aδ)
2a ), it is easy to
find a closed form solution to (42). We let G[z] denote the cumulative distribution of a standard normal
distribution, and G−1[z] its inverse. The final result can be stated as follows:
Proposition 4.1.1
For each y ∈ R, let Φy : [M,R]→ R denote the function
Φy[w] = ye−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ) + σ
√
1− e−2aδ
2a
·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]
(48)
and let Ψy : [M,R] → R denote the function Ψy[w] = (w −M)Φy[w]. If Φy[M ] > 0, the function Ψy is
quasiconcave and has a unique maximum with a strictly positive function value.
At time t− δ the parties should observe y = Dt−δ, and a unique Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained
at
w∗t =

Argmax[Ψy] if Φy[M ] > 0
M otherwise
q∗t =

Φy[Argmax[Ψy]] if Φy[M ] > 0
0 otherwise
(49)
To prove Proposition 4.1.1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1.2
In this lemma G[x] is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Let
0 ≤ m ≤ 1, and for each m consider the function hm : R→ R defined by
hm[z] = z(1−m−G[z])−G′[z] (50)
Then
hm[z] < 0 for all z ∈ R (51)
Proof of Lemma 4.1.2
Note that if z ≥ 0, then hm[z] ≤ h0[z] and if z ≤ 0, then hm[z] ≤ hL[z]. It hence suffices to prove the
lemma for m = 0 and m = 1. Using G′′[z] = −z · G′[z], it is easy to see that h′′m[z] = −G′[z] ≤ 0. If
m = 0, it is straightforward to check that h0 is strictly increasing, and that limz→+∞ h0[z] = 0. If m = 1,
it is straightforward to check that hL[z] is strictly decreasing, and that limz→−∞ hL[z] = 0. This proves
that h0 and hL are strictly negative, completing the proof of the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1.1
From (47), we easily see that the statement qt ≤ Dt is equivalent to the inequality
qt −
(
Dt−δe−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ
) ≤ ∫ t
t−δ
σea(s−t)dBs (52)
The left-hand side is Et-measurable, while the right-hand side is normally distributed and independent
of Et. Using the Itoˆ isometry, we see that the right-hand side has expected value zero and variance
σ2(1−e−2aδ)
2a . It is then straightforward to see that
E
[X[0,Dt](qˆt)|Et] = 1−G
qt − (Dt−δe−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ))√
σ2(1−e−2aδ)
2a
 (53)
and (48) follows trivially from (44). It remains to prove that the function Ψy has a unique maximum if
Φy[M ] > 0. First put
yˆ =
y · e−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ)
σ
√
1−e−2aδ
2a
(54)
and note that Ψy is proportional to
(w −M)
(
yˆ +G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
])
(55)
We make a monotone change of variables using z = G−1
[
1− w−SR−S
]
. With this change of variables we
see that Ψy is proportional to
(R− S)
(
1−G[z]− M − S
R− S
)
(yˆ + z) (56)
Put m = M−SR−S , and note that Ψy is proportional to
(1−m−G[z])(yˆ + z) (57)
Φy[M ] > 0 is equivalent to yˆ+G−1[1−m] > 0, and the condition w ≥M is equivalent to z ≤ G−1[1−m].
Note that if S ≤M ≤ R, then 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. For each fixed 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, yˆ ∈ R consider the function
fm[z] = (1−m−G[z])(yˆ + z) on the interval − yˆ ≤ z ≤ G−1[1−m] (58)
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If yˆ +G−1[1−m] > 0, the interval is nondegenerate and nonempty, and
f ′m[z] = −G′[z](yˆ + z) + (1−m−G[z]) (59)
Note that f ′m[−yˆ] > 0, and that fm[−yˆ] = fm[G−1[1 −m]] = 0. These functions therefore have at least
one strictly positive maximum. To prove that the maximum is unique, assume that f ′m[z0] = 0, and
compute f ′′m[z0]. Using G
′′[z] = −z · g′[z], it follows that
f ′′m[z0] = z0(1−m−G[z0])− 2G′[z0] < z0(1−m−G[z0])−G′[z0] < 0 (60)
by Lemma 4.1.2. The function is thus quasiconcave and has a unique, strictly positive maximum. Exis-
tence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium then follows from Theorem 3.2.2.

The condition Φy[M ] > 0 has an obvious interpretation. The manufacturer cannot offer a wholesale
price w lower than the production cost M . If Φy[M ] ≤ 0, it means that the retailer is unable to make a
positive expected profit even at the lowest wholesale price the manufacturer can offer. When that occurs,
the retailer’s best strategy is to order q = 0 units. When the retailer orders q = 0 units, the choice of w
is arbitrary. However, the choice w = M is the only strategy that is increasing and continuous in y.
Given values for the parameters a, µ, σ, S,M,R, and δ, the explicit expression in (48) makes it straight-
forward to construct the deterministic function y 7→ Argmax[Ψy] numerically. Two different graphs of
this function are shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the corresponding function Φy[Argmax[Ψy]]. In the
construction we used a delay δ = 7 and δ = 30, with the parameter values
a = 0.05 µ = 100 σ = 12 R = 10 S = 1 M = 2 (61)
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δ = 7 δ = 30
Figure 2: w∗t as a function of the observed demand rate D = Dt−δ
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Figure 3: q∗t as a function of the observed demand rate D = Dt−δ
Note that the manufacturing cost M = 2 is relatively low, and Φy[M ] > 0 is satisfied for all y > 0
in these cases. It is interesting to note that the equilibria change considerably when the delay increases
from δ = 7 to δ = 30 (notice the scale on the y-axis).
4.2. Further applications to the case with fixed R
Explicit results like the one in Proposition 4.1.1 can be carried out in a number of different cases. A
complete discussion of these cases would be too long to be include here, and is provided in a separate
paper Øksendal et al (2012). To demonstrate the usefulness of this theory, we briefly survey the results
in Øksendal et al (2012):
• The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with time-variable (deterministic) coefficients: Existence, unique-
ness, and explicit solutions for the equilibria.
• Geometric Brownian motion with constant coefficients: Existence, uniqueness, and explicit solu-
tions for the equilibria. Interestingly, the equilibrium wholesale price wt is constant in this case, and the
retailer orders a fixed fraction of the observed demand.
• Geometric Brownian motion with time-variable (deterministic) coefficients: Existence, uniqueness,
and explicit solutions for the equilibria. In this case the equilibrium wholesale price is not constant. It
is, however, given by a deterministic function, and as a consequence the manufacturer needs not observe
demand to settle the price.
• Geometric Le´vy processes: Explicit solutions for the equilibria are offered for special cases with
random coefficients, leading to non-Markovian solutions. Existence and uniqueness is established for some
cases. Typically the manufacturer has an equilibrium wholesale price defined in terms of a deterministic
function, and needs not observed demand. The retailer should observe both demand and the growth rate
of demand as his optimal order q is a deterministic function of these two quantities.
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5. R-dependent demand
In this section we provide a solution to an example with R-dependent demand. This problem is more
difficult than the case we handled in the previous section. We also discuss a more complicated example,
raising some interesting issues for future research.
5.1. An example with R-dependent demand
When demand depends on Rt, Theorem 3.2.2 no longer applies. High profits at some stage may
become too costly later, due to reduced demand, and the problem can no longer be separated into
independent one-periodic problems. In particular we shall see that (13) no longer holds. However, we can
still apply the maximum principle for the optimization of JF (the follower problem), since this part does
not need (13). To simplify the discussion, we note that in the particular case where the coefficients µ, σ, γ
do not depend on D, then the adjoint equations (15)–(16) have the trivial solution aL(t) = bL(t) = 0. If
dDt = (K −Rt)dt+ σdBt (62)
the second pair of adjoint variables is also solvable, i.e., (11)–(12) has the explicit solution
aF (t) = E
[∫ T
t
(Rs − S)X[0,qs](Ds)ds|Et
]
bF (t) = 0 (63)
If we make the simplifying assumption that Rt is decided at time t−δ, i.e., at the same time as wt and qt,
then, maximizing the Hamiltonian HF as in Theorem 3.2.1, we arrive by (33) and (34) at the following
first-order conditions for the optimal functions wt = wˆt, q = qˆt = Φ1(wˆ)(t) and R = Rˆt = Φ2(wˆ)(t):
E
[
X[0,D+t ](qt)|Et
]
=
wt − S
Rt − S t ∈ [δ, T ] (64)
E
[
min[Dt, qt]−
∫ T
t
(Rs − S)X[0,qs](Ds)ds|Et
]
= 0 t ∈ [δ, T ] (65)
The functions φ1 and φ2 are found solving (64)-(65), as explained in the following.
It is interesting to note that while (64) can be solved pointwise in t, (65) depends on path properties in
the remaining time period, reflecting that decisions taken at one point in time influence later performance.
The optimal order quantity qt = Φ1(w)(t) can be found from the equations as follows: Using the same
separation technique that we used in Section 4, we can express qt explicitly in terms of wt and Rt:
qt = Dt−δ +
∫ t
t−δ
(K −Rs)ds+
√
σδ ·G−1
[
1− wt − S
Rt − S
]
(66)
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If we put t = δ, we obtain
qδ = D0 +
∫ δ
0
(K −Rs)ds+
√
σδ ·G−1
[
1− wδ − S
Rδ − S
]
(67)
The interesting point here is that we need to know the prices Rt, 0 ≤ t ≤ δ in the period prior to the sales
period [δ, T ]. One option is to consider these values as exogenously given initial values, which is typical
when handling differential equations with delay. Alternatively, these prior values can be considered part
of the decision process. In that case, the choice Rt = 0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ δ is optimal as it leads to higher
values of initial demand, clearly an advantage for both the retailer and the manufacturer. This strategy
corresponds to advertising in the presales period, in which case a small number of items are given away
free to stimulate demand.
We now proceed to solve (64)–(65): By (64) we obtain
E
[X[0,qt](Dt)|Et] = 1− wt − SRt − S (68)
The function
x 7→ ht(x) := E[X[0,x](Dt)|Et]
is strictly increasing and hence has an inverse h−1t (x). Thus (68) can be written
qt = h−1t
(
Rt − wt
(Rt − wt) + wt − S
)
= h−1t
(
y
y + wt − S
)
y=Rt−wt
(69)
If we substitute (68) into (65), we get
E
[∫ T
t
(Rs − S)
(
1− ws − S
Rs − S
)
ds
∣∣∣Et] = E[min[Dt, qt]|Et],
or
E
[∫ T
t
(Rs − ws)ds
∣∣∣Et] = Yt, (70)
where
Y : = E[min[Dt, qt]|Et] = E[qtX[0,Dt](qt)|Et] + ft(qt)
= qt
wt − S
Rt − S + ft(qt), (71)
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with
ft(x) = E[DtX[0,x](Dt)|Et]. (72)
Hence, by (69)
Yt = Ft(wt, Rt − wt), (73)
where
Ft(w, y) = h−1t
(
y
y + w − S
)
w − S
y + w − S + ft
(
h−1t
(
y
y + w − S
))
. (74)
For each fixed t and w, let F−1t (w, ·) be a measurable left-inverse of the mapping
y 7→ Ft(w, y),
in the sense that
F−1t (w,Ft(w, y)) = y for all y ∈ R. (75)
Then
Rs − ws = F−1s (ws, Ys); s ∈ [0, T ]. (76)
Therefore equation (70) can be written
E
[∫ T
t
F−1s (ws,Ys)ds
∣∣∣Et] = Yt; t ∈ [δ, T ] (77)
This is a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) in the unknown process Yt. It can be refor-
mulated as follows: Find an Et-adapted process Yt and an Et-martingale Zt such that
dYt = −F−1t (wt,Yt)dt+ dZt; t ∈ [δ, T ]
YT = 0
(78)
From known BSDE theory we obtain the existence and uniqueness of a solution for (Yt, Zt) of such an
equation under certain conditions on the driver process F−1t (wt,Yt). For example, it suffices that
E
[∫ T
δ
F−1t (wt,0)
2dt
]
<∞ and y 7→ F−1t (wt,y) is Lipschitz (79)
See, e.g., Pardoux and Peng (1990) or El Karoui et al. (1997) and the references therein. Moreover, Yt and
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Zt can be obtained as a fixed point of a contraction operator and hence as a limit of an iterative procedure.
This makes it possible to compute Yt numerically in some cases. In general, however, the solution of the
BSDE (78) need not be unique, because F−1t (wt,·) is not necessarily unique, and, even if Ft is invertible
it is not clear that the inverse satisfies (79). If we assume that the solution Yt = Yt(ω) of (78) has been
found, then the optimal Rt = Rˆt(w) = Φ2(w) is given by (76) and the optimal qt = qˆt(w) = Φ1(w)(t) is
given by (69).
Finally we turn to the manufacturer´s maximization problem. The performance functional for the
manufacturer has the form:
JL(w,Φ(w)) = E
[∫ T
0
(wt −M)(qˆ(w))tdt
]
(80)
Therefore, by (69) and by (76) the problem to maximize JL(w,Φ(w)) over all paths w, can be regarded
as a problem of optimal stochastic control of a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential
equations (FBSDEs), as follows:
(Forward system)
dDt = (K −Rt)dt+ σdBt = (K − wt − F−1t (wt, Yt))dt+ σdBt; D0 ∈ R (81)
(Backward system)

dYt = −F−1t (wt,Yt)dt+ dZt; t ∈ [δ, T ]
YT = 0
(82)
(Performance functional)
J(w) := E
[∫ T
0
(wt −M)h−1t
(
F−1t (wt, Yt)
F−1t (wt, Yt) + wt − S
)
dt
]
(83)
This is a special case of the following stochastic control problem of a coupled system of FBSDEs:
(Forward system)
dXt = b(t,Xt, Y t, ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt, Yt, ut)dBt (84)
X0 ∈ R
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(Backward system)
dYt = −g(t, ut, Yt)dt+ dZt (85)
YT = 0
(Performance functional)
J(u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, Yt, ut)dt
]
(86)
Here ut is our control. To handle this problem, we need an extension of the result in Øksendal and Sulem
(2012) to systems with the coupling given in (84) and (86). The extension is straightforward and we get
the following solution procedure:
Define the Hamiltonian
H(t, x, y, w, λ, p, q) = (w −M)qˆt(w − y) + λF−1t (w, y) + p(K − w − F−1t (w, y)) + q σ (87)
The adjoint processes λt, pt, qt are given by the following FB system:
dλt =
∂H
∂y
(t)dt =
(
(wt −M)(−qˆ′t(wt − Yt) + λt
d
dy
(
F−1t (wt, y)
)
y=Yt
)
dt ; t ≥ 0 (88)
λ0 = 0
dpt = −∂H
∂x
(t)dt+ qtdBt = qtdBt (89)
pT = 0
From (89) we get pt = qt = 0, and the first order condition for maximization of the functional w 7→
H(t,Dt, w, λt, pt, qt) becomes
(wˆ −M)qˆ′t(wt − Yt) + qˆt(wt − Yt) + λˆ(t)
d
dw
(
F−1t (w, Yˆ (t)
)
w=wˆt
= 0 (90)
We formulate what we have proved in a proposition.
Proposition 5.1.1
Suppose that the demand process is as in (62) and that Et = Ft−δ; t ≥ δ. Suppose that an optimal
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solution wˆt, qˆt = Φ1(wˆ)(t), and Rˆt = Φ2(wˆ)(t) of the Stackelberg game (21)–(22) exists. Then the
retailer’s optimal order response qt = Φ1(w)(t) and optimal price Rt = Φ2(w)(t), respectively, are given
by
Φ1(w)(t) = h−1t
(
Rt − wt
Rt − S
)
(91)
Φ2(w)(t) = wt + F−1t (wt, Yt), (92)
where Yt = Y
(wt)
t is a solution of the BSDE (78) for some measurable left inverse F
−1
t (wt,·) of Ft(wt,·).
Accordingly, the manufacturer’s wholesale price wˆt is the solution wt of equation (90).
Some remarks
Even though the result in Proposition 5.1.1 only covers a special case, we believe that the solution features
insights to more general cases. We see that once Rt is decided, the order quantity qt can be found via a
pointwise optimization. This is true because the order size does not influence demand, and a suboptimal
choice at time t cannot be compensated by improved performance later on. We expect this strategy to
hold more generally.
Once qt is eliminated from the equations, the optimal retail price is found via a transformation to a
backward stochastic differential equation. We believe that similar transformations might work for other
cases. It makes good sense that the optimal retail price satisfies a backward problem. As we approach
time T , it becomes less important what happens later on. In the limiting stages we take all we can get,
leading to an end-point constraint.
If Ft is not invertible, our framework will allow for solutions that might jump to new levels. Solutions
of this type are found regularly when solving ordinary stochastic control problems. Our setup appears
to allow for a similar type of effect in a quite unexpected way. A possible conjecture is that there exist
switching levels, i.e., when demand reaches a low level the retailer should stop selling and lower prices to
increase demand (sell marginal quantities with marketing effects in mind), and start selling when demand
reaches a high enough level. Non-uniqueness of F−1t could lead to switching effects of this kind. This is
an interesting problem which is left for future research.
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5.2. A second example allowing complete elimination of the adjoint equations
Another model admitting a similar type of analysis is:
dDt = Dt(K −Rt)dt+ σDtdBt (93)
This is a second example where the adjoint equations can be solved explicitly, eventually leading to a
system of the form
E
[X[0,Dt](qt)|Et] = wt − SRt − S t ∈ [δ, T ] (94)
E
[
min[Dt, qt]− DtΓF (t) ·
∫ T
t
(Rs − S)X[0,qs](Ds)ΓF (s)ds|Et
]
= 0 t ∈ [δ, T ] (95)
(wt −M)φL′(wt) + φL(wt)− φF ′(wt) · E
[
Dt
ΓL(t)
∫ T
t
ΓL(s)ds|Et
]
= 0 t ∈ [δ, T ] (96)
where
dΓL(t) = ΓL(t)(−φF (wt)dt+ σbL(t)dBt) ΓL(0) = 1 (97)
dΓF (t) = ΓF (t)(Rtdt+ σbF (t)dBt) ΓF (0) = 1 (98)
We see that even though the adjoint equations can be eliminated, the resulting system is an order of
magnitude more complicated than (64)–(??). We have not been able to find a solution to this case. More
refined solution procedures that could handle such problems analytically or numerically would be of great
value, and is an interesting topic for future research.
5.3. An example with explicit solution
In this section we consider a simplified case with R-dependent demand, but where the contract must
be written upfront, i.e., that w, q,R are decided once and for all prior to the sales period. This corresponds
to the case when
Et = Et = F0 = {∅,Ω} for all t ∈ [δ, T ].
so that
E[Y |Et] = E[Y ] for all t
It can be shown that the maximum principle can be modified to cover this situation. We do not give the
proof here, but refer to the argument given in Section 10.4 in Øksendal and Sulem (2007): When the
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controls w, q,R are not allowed to depend on t, we consider the t-integrated Hamiltonians, given by (see
(12)-(17))
H˜F (w, q,R, aF , bF , cF ) :=
∫ T
δ
HF (t,Dt, w, q, R, aF (t), bF (t), cF (t))dt
=(R− S)
∫ T
δ
min[Dt, q]dt− (w − S)qT + (K −R)
∫ T
δ
aF (t)dt (99)
and
H˜L
φ(w, aL, bL, cL) :=
∫ T
δ
HL
φ(t,Dt, w, aL(t), bL(t), cL(t))dt
=(w −M)φL(w)T = (w −M)qˆ(w)T, (100)
where φ(w) = (φL(w), φF (w)) = (qˆ(w), Rˆ(w)) is the maximizer with respect to q and R of
(p, q) 7→E[H˜(w, p, q, aF , bF , cF )]
=(R− S)E
[∫ T
δ
min[Dt, q]dt
]
− (w − S)qT + (K −R)E
[∫ T
δ
aF (t)dt
]
(101)
The optimal constant value w = wˆ chosen by the manufacturer, is then the maximizer of
w 7→ E[H˜Lφ(w, aL, bL, cL)] = (w −M)qˆ(w)T.
This gives the following first order conditions for the optimal (q,R) and w, (see (63)-(64))
E
[∫ T
δ
X[0,D+t ](q)dt
]
=
w − S
R− S , (102)
E
[∫ T
δ
min[Dt, q]dt
]
= (R− S)E
[∫ T
δ
(∫ T
t
X[0,q](Ds)ds
)
dt
]
(103)
and
(w −M) d
dw
qˆ(w, Rˆ(w)) + qˆ(w, Rˆ(w)) = 0, (104)
where qˆ(w,R) is the solution of (90) for given w,R. Substituting q = qˆ(w,R) into (91), we find the
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optimal Rˆ = Rˆ(w) by solving (91), which can be reformulated to
Rˆ = S +
E
[∫ T
δ
min[Dt, qˆ(w, Rˆ)]dt
]
E
[∫ T
δ
tX[0,qˆ(w,Rˆ)](Dt)dt
] (105)
by changing the order of integration. The main result can be summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3.1
If the values of q,R and w are required to be constant, then the optimal values qˆ, Rˆ, wˆ are given as follows:
For given (w,R) let qˆ(w,R) be the solution of (90). Next let Rˆ = Rˆ(w) be the solution of (93). Then wˆ
is found as the solution of (92).
To get an impression how this works in a specific case, we consider the demand given by (62). In that
example we have
P (Dt ≤ q) = G
[
q −D0 − (K −R)t
σ
√
t
]
(106)
The equation (90) takes the form
∫ T
δ
P (Dt ≤ q)dt = T − w − S
R− S (107)
This equation clearly has no analytical solution, but can be handled numerically. (93) leads to the
equation
R = S +
∫ T
δ
∫ q
δ
z√
2pitσ2
e
− (z−D0−(K−R)t)2
2σ
√
t dz + q · (1− P (Dt ≤ q))dt∫ T
δ
t · P (Dt ≤ q)dt
(108)
which we also think is reasonable to handle, as given w this is an equation in 1-variable only. Tables of
q = q(R,w) and R = R(w) can then be constructed numerically, and values from these tables can be
used to find maximum of the 1-variable function
w 7→ (w −M)q(R(w), w)T
Since this process is Markov, we see that the parties only need to know D0 to write the contract at time
t = 0.
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6. Concluding remarks
This paper has two main topics. First, we develop a new theory for stochastic differential Stackelberg
games and second we apply that theory to continuous time newsvendor problems. In the continuous time
newsvendor problem we offer a full description of the general case where our stochastic demand rate Dt
is a function of the retail price Rt. The wholesale price wt and the order rate qt are decided based on
information present at time t− δ, while the retail price can in general be decided later, i.e., at time t− δR
where δ > δR. This problem can be solved using Theorem 3.2.1. However, the solution is defined in
terms of a coupled system of stochastic differential equations and in general such systems are hard to
solve in terms of explicit expressions.
The case where demand is independent of R, leads to the simpler version in Theorem 3.2.2. If demand
is given by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, there is a unique, closed form solution to the problem. In
Section 5 we have discussed some examples with R-dependent demand. These cases are simple, but
nonetheless they appear to capture important economic effects. It would hence be quite interesting if
one could solve such problems using more refined expressions. A further analysis of these and similar
examples poses real challenges, however, and much more work will be needed before we can understand
these issues in full. This is, therefore, an interesting topic for future research.
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